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Bailout policy is time-inconsistent, which results in multiple equilibria characterized by too 
much leverage, high risk correlation and little liquidity holding. I show that a long-run 
horizon allows the policy-maker to define bailout plans that rule out the worse equilibria. 
This result contrasts with the standard finding in environments with a unique equilibrium, 
as in most applications, in which a long-run horizon allows the policy-maker to support 
superior outcomes in equilibrium. I use this framework to discuss the effectiveness of three 
prudential policy proposals: too-big-to-fail size caps, taxes on borrowing and liquidity 
requirements. I also argue that policies alleviating the time-inconsistency of bailouts may 
generate large welfare gains. In this regard,  I discuss three alternatives: policies against the 




La inconsistencia temporal de la política de salvatajes financieros genera multiplicidad de 
equilibrios en los que los bancos tienen alto apalancamiento, alta correlación de riesgo entre 
ellos, y bajas provisiones de liquidez. En este artículo muestro que un horizonte de política 
de largo plazo permite a la autoridad financiera evitar la realización de los peores 
equilibrios. Esto contrasta con el resultado estándar en ambientes con un equilibrio único, 
como en la mayoría de las aplicaciones, en los que un horizonte de largo plazo permite a la 
autoridad generar equilibrios socialmente superiores. Complementariamente, utilizo mi 
marco teórico para analizar la efectividad de tres propuestas de política macro-
prudenciales: restricciones al tamaño de los bancos, impuestos al endeudamiento, y 
requisitos mínimos de liquidez. También argumento que la reducción de la inconsistencia 
intertemporal de la política de salvatajes financieros genera grandes beneficios sociales, y 
propongo tres formas de lograrlo: políticas contra la escasez de liquidez durante las crisis, 
el diseño mismo de los salvatajes, y el rol de la deuda pública. 
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Kydland and Prescott (1977) uncovered a time-inconsistency problem of policy arising when
outcomes depend on expected policy: Even a benevolent authority breaks ex-post its promises
of "tough" policies, which in turn induces agents to take ex-ante actions that decrease social
welfare. Bailout policy also suﬀers from time inconsistency which induces banks’ moral haz-
ard in the form of high leverage, high risk correlation and little liquidity holding (Acharya
and Yorulmazer, 2007; Diamond and Rajan, 2009; Farhi and Tirole, 2009, 2010a). This
misbehavior has been pointed out at the core of the recent ﬁnancial crisis.1 As a response, a
wide variety of prudential policies have been proposed to correct it–not to tackle its source.2
I study the time-inconsistency problem of bailouts when the authority takes into account
the future eﬀect of its policy actions in a ﬁnancial economy. Most of the related literature
focuses on static environments. Only Chari and Kehoe (2009) has the same focus, but my
ﬁnancial environment–in which leverage, liquidity and risk correlation arise endogenously–
delivers sharply distinct results. Speciﬁcally, I apply sustainable plans (Chari and Kehoe,
1990) to bailout policy in an inﬁnitely repetead version of Farhi and Tirole (2009, 2010a)–
who use the liquidity model of Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) to study the misbehavior of
banks when bailout policy lacks commitment. I use this framework to study three issues.
First, the ways in which a long-run policy horizon alleviates the time-inconsistency problem.
Second, to critically discuss three popular prudential policy proposals: too-big-to-fail size
caps (Chari and Kehoe, 2009), taxes on borrowing (Bianchi and Mendoza, 2010; Jeanne and
Korinek, 2011) and liquidity requirements (Farhi and Tirole, 2009, 2010a). Finally, to show
that policies tackling the time-inconsistency of bailouts have the potential to create large
welfare gains. In this regard, I discuss other three types of policy: the mitigation of the
scarcity of liquidity during crises, the design of bailouts, and public debt.
The baseline economy has entrepreneurs and households living three periods. Entrepre-
neurs can invest in risky and riskless assets while households can only invest in riskless assets.
Households thus lend to entrepreneurs to invest in risky assets, which have a higher return.
However, there is credit rationing since only a portion of future income is pledgeable. If a
"distress" state is realized in period two, risky assets need reinvestment; otherwise the assets
are lost. The more riskless assets entrepreneurs hold (liquidity), the more new loans they
get for reinvestment. Critically, an authority may "bailout" entrepreneurs by decreasing the
interest rate of loans at the cost of distorting households’ savings decisions.
1For instance, Diamond and Rajan (2008) and Brunnermeier (2009).
2There is more than one source for this misbehavior; I focus on the time-inconsistency of bailouts.
1Farhi and Tirole (2009, 2010a) show that there are no bailouts under commitment in this
economy. Entrepreneurs will hoard enough liquidity to ensure full reinvestment, which is the
constrained eﬃcient outcome. Under discretion, many bailout policies are time-consistent,
including no bailouts. If a no-bailouts policy is deﬁned ex-ante and agents believe it, then
no bailout is implemented ex-post. More broadly, any bailout policy is implemented ex-post
if agents ex-ante expect such a policy as long as the implied distortions on households are
not too large. The concavity of households’ utility creates an upper bound for the size of a
time-consistent bailout. Hence, inferior equilibria exist in which entrepreneurs leverage too
much, hoard too little liquidity and correlate their risk exposure such that they all need a
bailout at the same time, leading to the implementation of large distortionary bailouts.
I interpret this result as a time-inconsistency problem similar to the dams example in
Kydland and Prescott (1977): If agents expect no dams (bailouts) to be built (implemented)
on a ﬂood plain (distressed economy), no houses are constructed there (enough liquidity is
hoarded), so dams (bailouts) are not necessary. But if houses are built in the ﬂood plain (not
enough liquidity is hoarded), the authority will be forced to build the dams (to bail out).3
The problem then is not that the authority breaks its promises ex-post if agents believe them
ex-ante, as in most applications, but that promises are broken when larger-than-promised
bailouts are expected.4 Only the largest time-consistent bailout is "resistant" in the sense
that it is the only promise that is not broken to match expectations of even larger bailouts.
A natural question is whether reputation may substitute for commitment in this context.
I produce a non-overlapping generations economy such that each generation is a repetition
of the baseline model. This is the simplest way to introduce a long-run policy horizon, in
particular, I study sustainable plans (Chari and Kehoe, 1990). A bailout policy is sustainable
if the authority does not deviate from it when agents follow a trigger strategy: They believe
the plan if the authority has not previously deviated from its plans; otherwise they expect
the largest bailout under discretion. In other words, the authority suﬀers a ﬁxed cost after
a deviation, which is interpreted as a reputation loss. I ﬁnd that all time-consistent policies
in the baseline economy are sustainable. However, I also ﬁnd that not only the largest
time-consistent bailout is "resistant". Hence, despite the fact that reputation does not help
to support better time-consistent policies, it does alleviates the time-inconsistency problem
since allows the authority to deﬁne plans that rule out the worse equilibria. Smaller time-
consistent bailout plans are "resistant" as the authority becomes more patient.
3Ennis and Keister (2009) show that a similar result holds for freezing deposits policy after a bank run
in the Diamond and Dibvig (1983) banking economy.
4Promises are also broken when smaller-than-promised bailouts are expected, but this situation delivers
superior equilibria.
2Unfortunately, increasing the patience of an authority is a diﬃcult task in practice. Hence
I focus on the case when the authority is not patient enough to make a no-bailout policy
resistant. This analysis delivers two main results. First, even a small reduction in resistant
bailout plans may create large welfare gains. This is because the concavity of households’
utility implies that the social cost of a bailout in each generation is convex in the size of
bailouts, and smaller bailouts increase current and future generations’ welfare. The second
result is that an exogenous reduction in the smallest resistant bailout plan is ampliﬁed by
a dynamic spillover. Given a plan, the ﬁxed cost of a policy deviation is the diﬀerence in
future welfare when agents believe the plan and when they expect the largest bailout under
discretion. If a smaller bailout plan becomes resistant, the ﬁxed cost of a policy deviation
increases, which implies that an even smaller bailout plan becomes resistant.
I then use this framework to study three popular prudential policy proposals. I show that
too-big-to-fail size caps (Chari and Kehoe, 2009) do not change the authority’s incentives
per se, so risk correlation implies that such a policy becomes ineﬀective if banks can cre-
a t en e wb a n k so ri n c r e a s et h es i z eo fs m a l l e r banks. I also show that taxes on borrowing
(Bianchi and Mendoza, 2010; Jeanne and Korinek, 2011) may induce more borrowing if the
tax ﬁnances bailouts or its rebate is pledgeable. This is because the authority’s incentives
remain unaﬀected but entrepreneurs’ credit constraint is relaxed. Similarly, if the tax re-
duces households’ tax burden, the distortionary cost of bailouts decreases, worsening the
time-inconsistency problem and inducing more borrowing. In contrast, I show that liquidity
requirements still help even if circumvented by using toxic assets (Farhi and Tirole, 2009,
2010a) because such a policy helps to support smaller resistant bailout plans.
Finally, I also show that policy mitigating liquidity evaporation during crises–a sudden
scarcity of liquidity, such as the episode triggered after Lehman’s failure–alleviates time-
inconsistency. The design of bailouts, such as supporting the buyer banks but not the
failing banks (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007), reduces incentives to correlate risk and thus
alleviates the time-inconsistency. Public debt, a commonly suggested commitment device in
monetary policy (Persson, Persson and Svensson, 2006) and capital taxation (Dominguez,
2007), is also eﬀective. However, these policies may not fully exploit the dynamic spillover
if they similarly aﬀect the incentives of impatient and patient authorities.
Literature review. Most work uses static models to study banks’ misbehavior when pol-
icy lacks commitment (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Farhi and Tirole 2009, 2010a) and
optimal bailout policy (Diamond and Rajan, 2009). I study time-consistent bailout policy
for a patient authority and its interaction with other policies. Despite I use Farhi and Ti-
role (2009, 2010a) as starting point, our goals are diﬀerent. Only Chari and Kehoe (2009)
3is similar in spirit to this paper, but not in the details. They apply sustainable plans to
bailout policy in a repeated economy where ineﬃcient bankruptcies serve to discipline man-
agers. The authority bails out ﬁrms to avoids bankruptcies, which induces managers to
shirk. Their economy has a unique equilibrium policy under discretion; mine has multiple.
Hence they ﬁnd the standard result that a long-run horizon allows the authority to sustain
better policies as equilibrium; I ﬁnd that the authority can set plans that rule out the worse
equilibria. In addition, they conclude that a size cap solves the time-inconsistency problem;
I conclude that risk correlation–which is missing in their analysis–reverts this result. Their
paper also calls for ex-ante regulation to solve the time-inconsistency; I argue that policies
before, during or after crises help as long as they contribute to supporting smaller "resistant"
bailout plans. Finally, I study a richer variety of policies and point out that, if solving the
time-inconsistency is too ambitious, even a small alleviation may create large welfare gains.
Layout. Section 2 displays basic results in a one-generation model. Section 3 introduces
inﬁnite generations and studies time-consistent bailout plans. Section 4 focuses on the three
prudential policies studied in this paper. Section 5 discusses how to alleviate the time-
inconsistency and Section 6 concludes. A notation table is added as an appendix.
2 Baseline model
This section follows Farhi and Tirole (2009, 2010a) to produce a one-generation model.
2.1 Setup
Consider a static economy with three stages, s =0 ,1,2.5 There are two types of agents in
this economy, each with total mass one: households and entrepreneurs.











2 denotes consumption in stages s =0 ,1,2 and u(·) satisﬁes u  > 0,u    < 0.








5Notation t is reserved for generations when this economy is inﬁnitely repeated in Section 3.
4There are two types of assets: riskless assets and risky assets. Riskless assets are available
for both households and entrepreneurs and simply transfer one unit of consumption across
stages. In contrast, only entrepreneurs can invest in risky assets. These assets provide a
gross return ρ1 > 1 in stage s =2if there is "no distress" in stage s =1(with probability
α). If there is "distress" in s =1(with probability 1 − α), investment in risky assets is lost
unless there is reinvestment in s =1 .6 Risky assets then provide ρ1 of gross return of the
reinvestment scale in s =2 . For either "no distress" or "distress" only a portion ρ0 < 1 of
the total expected returns is pledgeable.7
T h e r ei sa l s oa nauthority (for instance, a central bank), which can tax riskless investment
in s =1 , so its eﬀective return is R ≤ 1. This tax is interpreted as a "bailout",8 which is
rebated via lump-sum transfers in s =2 . The authority’s objective is
V + βU
where β represents the relative weight of entrepreneurs’ welfare.
Timing. The timing of actions is as follows:
Stage s =0 : Households receive e0 and decide ch
0, how much to invest in the riskless asset
and to lend to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs receive A and decide cent
0 ,h o wm u c ht oi n v e s t
in risky assets i and in riskless assets xi.
Stage s =1 : Households receive e1 and the aggregate state of nature is revealed: "no
distress" (with probability α) and "distress" (with probability 1 − α). In the distress state,
households decide how much to invest in riskless assets and to lend to entrepreneurs for
reinvestment; entrepreneurs receive no endowment and decide their reinvestment scale j in
risky assets. In the no distress state, risky assets do not need reinvestment, so households




Stage s =2 : No one receives an endowment. Risky and riskless assets pay back, taxes are
rebated, and agents choose ch
2 and cent
2 .
Two cases will be studied: One in which the authority chooses R at s =0 , and another
in which R is chosen after the state is drawn at the beginning of s =1 .
6The distress state represents a scenario in which an aggregate liquidity shock hits the economy.
7Limited pledgeability is assumed exogenous, but it may be justiﬁed by an optimal contract between
households and entrepreneurs that induce the latter to exert high eﬀort (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998).
8Abusing a bit of notation, any policy R ≤ 1 is also called a bailout (of size 1 − R).
52.2 Competitive equilibrium given policy
I solve for the equilibrium interaction between households and entrepreneurs treating policy
R and expected policy Re as exogenous variables. Later I use the results obtained here to
compute a reduced form of the authority’s objective to be used in the policy analysis.
Deﬁnition 1 Let R be the eﬀective bailout policy implemented at stage s =1and Re be the
expected bailout policy at s =0 . A competitive equilibrium given {R,Re} is deﬁned as the
triple {i(R,Re),j(R,Re),x(R,Re)} such that
(i) Households maximize their utility V subject to their budget constraint.
(ii) Entrepreneurs maximize their utility U subject to their budget constraint.
(iii) The ﬁnancial market clears.
In equilibrium Re = R. However, the equilibrium set is diﬀerent depending on in which
stage the authority chooses R,e i t h e rs =0or 1–to be studied respectively in Sections 2.3
and 2.4. The representation of the competitive equilibrium given policy R and expected
policy Re is an artifact that helps to simplify the subsequent analysis.
Given investment scale i and liquidity hoarding xi, entrepreneurs borrow from households
i + xi − A,
the diﬀerence between their total investment in s =0and their endowment. Households’
endowment e0 is assumed large enough such that it is not binding. I also assume that
entrepreneurs invest all their endowment A in the risky asset (cent
0 =0 ), which is ensured by
1+( 1− α) <ρ 1.
The break-even condition for households in s =0is
i + xi − A = α(ρ0 + x)i. (1)
In words, households lend to entrepreneurs an amount equal to their total expected return.
Riskless investment has zero net return, so households ask for zero net return on loans.
Entrepreneurs repay to households only if there is no distress (because of limited liability),
in which case they pay their whole pledgeable income, (ρ0 + x)i.
6The break-even condition implies that
i(x)=
A
1+( 1− α)x − αρ0
.
If the distress state is realized in s =1 , the reinvestment scale is






because (ρ0j + xi) is the maximum amount pledgeable by entrepreneurs in s =1and R is
the riskless after-tax return. Entrepreneurs have no incentive to increase scale above i,w h i c h
justiﬁes the upper bound. Reinvestment may be further simpliﬁed to







which depends on liquidity hoarding x as a proportion of the initial investment scale i,p o l i c y
R, and the portion ρ0 of future returns that is pledgeable.

















Proof. Since payoﬀs are linear in the investment scale, the equation for x(Re) is obtained
by comparing the entrepreneurs’ expected payoﬀ of holding no liquidity, x =0 ,o rh o l d i n g
liquidity to ensure continuation at full scale for Re = R =1 .E q u a t i o n s f o r i(Re) and
j (R,Re) are obtained by substituting x(Re) into i(x) and j (x,R,i).
Note the diﬀerent channels through which R and Re aﬀect the equilibrium: R enters
directly only in reinvestment j; Re aﬀects liquidity hoarding x and indirectly i and j.
2.3 Bailouts under commitment
I now turn to ﬁnd the equilibrium bailout policy when the authority chooses R in s =0 ,s o
Re = R is internalized by the authority. The unique equilibrium has a no-bailouts policy.
7Households’ welfare from stage s =0on is
V
ex−ante (R,R






















d +( 1− R)

S
d − j (R,R
e)

The ﬁrst term in brackets is households’ consumption at s =0 ,w h i c hi st h ee n d o w m e n t
e0 minus the total lending to entrepreneurs. The second line is households’ consumption at
s =1 ,2 if there is no distress at s =1 . Investors utility at s =1is u

e1 − Snd
and at s =2
is the proceedings of their savings Snd (with zero net return) and of their s =0loans to
entrepreneurs, which yield ρ0+x(Re). The third line is households’ consumption at s =1 ,2
i ft h e r ei sd i s t r e s sa ts =1 . Investors have utility u

e1 − Sd
in s =1 , while at s =2the
proceedings of their savings RSd (including their investment in riskless assets and their new
loans to entrepreneurs, which both yield R ≤ 1), plus the rebate for the taxation on riskless
investment, (1 − R)[S − j (R,Re)].
V ex−ante (·) may be further simpliﬁed by using the households’ break-even condition in
(1) and deﬁning
ˆ V (R)=u(e1 − S)+S where u
  (·)=R. (2)
such that ˆ V (1) − ˆ V (R) is households’ welfare cost of a bailout R<1,w h e r eˆ V (R) is
increasing in R with ˆ V   (1) = 0 and ˆ V    < 0.T h u s ,
V
ex−ante (R,R
e)=e0 + αˆ V (1) + (1 − α)





Ex-ante welfare for entrepreneurs may be represented by
U
ex−ante (R,R
e)=( ρ1 − ρ0)[αi(R
e)+( 1− α)j (R,R
e)].
Entrepreneurs consume at s =2all their non-pledgeable income. Their investment in
risky assets at s =2is i(Re) if there is no distress at s =1and j (R,Re) i ft h e r ei sd i s t r e s s .
Total ex-ante welfare is
W
ex−ante (R,R
e)=e0 + αˆ V (1) + (1 − α)





+β (ρ1 − ρ0)[αi(R
e)+( 1− α)j (R,R
e)].
where β is the weight of entrepreneurs in the ﬁnancial authority’s objective.
8Further, under commitment Re = R, so risky investment will always continue at full scale:
W
ex−ante (R,R)=e0 + αˆ V (1) + (1 − α)

ˆ V (R) − (1 − R)i(R)
	
+ β (ρ1 − ρ0)i(R).
This expression captures the negative eﬀect on households’ welfare and the positive eﬀect
on entrepreneurs’ welfare of a larger bailout (lower R). For households, a lower R distorts
more their savings (ˆ V (R) is smaller) and increases transfers to entrepreneurs in the distress
state ((1 − R)i(R) is larger). Larger R increases entrepreneurs’ risky investment (i  (R) < 0),
and thus increases their consumption ((ρ1 − ρ0)i(R) is larger).
Proposition 2 There are no bailouts in equilibrium under commitment, R∗
c =1 ,i f
β (ρ1 − ρ0) ≤ (1 − α)+( 1− ρ0). (4)
Proof. Under condition (4), the overall eﬀect of decreasing R on ex-ante welfare is negative.
Thus,
∂Wex−ante(R,R)
∂R > 0 for R ≤ 1.
∂Wex−ante(R,R)
∂R < 0 for R>1 because increasing R
distorts households’ saving decisions and also decreases risky investment.
This proposition deﬁnes a benchmark for the subsequent analysis.
2.4 Bailouts under discretion
I solve for the equilibrium bailout policy when the authority chooses R in s =1 ,s ot h e
authority takes Re as given. There is now a continuum of equilibrium bailout policies,
including the no-bailouts policy.
Following computations in Section 2.3 and the equation for j (R,Re) in Proposition 1, the
o v e r a l ls o c i a lw e l f a r ef o rs t a g e ss =1 ,2 if the distress state is realized is
W
ex−post (R,R





Given expectations Re, the authority chooses R = Re if
W
ex−post (R,R







∀ R ≥ R. (5)
Proposition 3 The set of equilibrium bailouts under discretion is  d =[ R,1] such that







− ˆ V (R)
	
≤ w
 R − R
 R − ρ0
i(R) ∀ R ≥ R. (6)
9when w = β (ρ1 − ρ0) − (1 − ρ0) > 0. In addition, R ≥ ρ0
Proof. Condition (6) is the closed form of (5). R =1is an equilibrium; if Re =1 ,t h e na n y
policy  R>1 delivers lower ex-post welfare than R =1and  R<R e is never optimal because
j = i ∀ R<R e. The same argument applies for R ∈ [R,1] because ˆ V (·) is concave with
ˆ V   (1) = 0 and the right hand side of (6) is increasing in  R for any R>ρ 0.F o rRe <R ,t h e
cost of setting R = Re in terms of households’ welfare is higher than the beneﬁt of reducing
entrepreneurs’ losses, so a policy R<Rcannot be an equilibrium. R ≥ ρ0 because a policy
R ≤ ρ0 ensures j = i.
Discussion on time-inconsistency. Proposition 3 implies that, by construction, any
policy R ∈  d is time-consistent. A promise of any policy R ∈ [R,1] deﬁned at s =0is
implemented at s =1when agents believe it at s =0 , i.e., Re = R. However, if agents
expect Re  = R,w i t hRe ∈  d, the authority deviates from R to implement Re.
The model therefore implies that there exists a time-inconsistency problem since the
a u t h o r i t yc a n n o te n s u r et h a ti tw i l ln o tb r e a ke x - p o s ti t sp r o m i s e sm a d ee x - a n t e . T h i s
version of time-inconsistency is similar to the dams example in Kydland and Prescott (1977)
which is diﬀerent from most applications. For instance, in the monetary policy or taxation
literatures the authority responds to low expected inﬂation (or low expected taxes) with
a high inﬂation policy (or high taxes). In bailout policy, the authority matches agents’
expectations. Thus, the problem is not that the commitment policy is not possible, but
that inferior policies from an ex-ante perspective are also possible. This paper focuses on
monetary bailouts to keep Farhi and Tirole (2009, 2010a) as a clean starting point, but a
similar analysis applies for ﬁscal bailouts.9 In particular, in this environment an inferior
policy means that in equilibrium there is too little liquidity, too much borrowing, large
distortionary bailouts, and risk correlation among entrepreneurs, which is introduced next.
2.5 Endogenous correlation of risk
I now sketch the argument proposed by Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007), Farhi and Tirole
(2009, 2010a) and Diamond and Rajan (2009). Risk correlation motivates the abstraction of
idiosyncratic risk in the model and is used in Section 4 to evaluate a too-big-to-fail policy.
Assume that there are two states of distress at stage 1: distress1 and distress2 such that
α1 + α2 = α,
9Farhi and Tirole (2009) also show that monetary policy is important in the optimal design of bailouts.
10the probability of the economy being in distress is 1 − α. Also assume that entrepreneurs
choose their exposure–the probability they need reﬁnancing in a given state.
Proposition 4 There is a perfect correlation of risk exposure in equilibrium.
Proof. Let λ be the portion of the total investment that needs reﬁnancing in distress1.A







− ˆ V (R)
	
≤ λw
 R − R
 R − ρ0
i(R) ∀ R ≥ R.
The inf { d,1} is decreasing in λ and  d,1 →{ R∗
c} as λ → 0. Entrepreneurs are exposed to
the distress state in which R is lower. Since all entrepreneurs are identical, two equilibria
exist: λ =1 ,  d,1 =[ R,1] and  d,2 = R∗
c,a n dλ =0 ,  d,1 = {R∗
c} and  d,2 =[ R,1].
Risk correlation arises because bailouts are untargetted and, given a level of liquidity
hoarding, larger bailouts are implemented when more risky investment needs reﬁnancing.
3 Inﬁnite policy horizon
I now extend the model to non-overlapping generations that preserves its three-stages struc-
ture but allows the authority to internalize the future eﬀects of its actions. History-dependent
strategies introduce a ﬁxed cost of a deviation from predetermined bailout plans. I then study
the eﬀects of this ﬁxed cost on the time-inconsistency problem of bailouts.
3.1 Modiﬁcation of the baseline model
Consider an economy populated by generations of households and entrepreneurs. Each
generation lives for only one period t =0 ,1,...,∞. Endowments remain exogenous and
there are no intergenerational transfers or state variables, so there is no interaction among
generations. Each period is broken into three stages s =0 ,1,2, such that inside one period
the setup is identical to the baseline model of Section 2. There is again only one distress
state which gets revealed in stage s =1every period.
The competitive equilibrium in each period remains identical to Section 2 except that all

























Equation (7) describes the equilibrium risky investment scale i(Re
t) of generation-t en-
trepreneurs, which depends on their endowment A, the limit of pledgeability ρ0,a n dt h e
expected policy Re
t if there is distress in stage 1. For simplicity A and ρ0 are constant.
Equation (8) governs generation-t entrepreneurs’ liquidity hoarding x(Re
t) as a proportion
of i(Re
t) depending on Re
t and ρ0.F i n a l l y ,j (Rt,R e
t) in (9) is the equilibrium reinvestment
scale if there is distress in stage 1 at t depending on the diﬀerence between Rt and Re
t.
The only twist of this economy with respect to Section 2 is that the authority, unlike









where Wt is the generation-t welfare, as deﬁned in Section 2, and δ is the discount factor. If
δ =0 , equilibrium bailouts if decided at stage 0 and stage 1 in each period are respectively
identical to bailouts under commitment and discretion in Section 2.
Overlapping generations. With overlapping generations, a bailout at t does not only
aﬀect the reinvestment scale of generation-t entrepreneurs, but also the investment scale
of generation-t +1entrepreneurs. For expositional purposes this paper abstracts from this
latter eﬀect but it is straightforward to incorporate.
3.2 Sustainable bailout plans
I now turn to apply sustainable plans (Chari and Kehoe, 1990) to bailouts. As under
discretion, the authority chooses Rt at stage 1 in every period. A sustainable plan is a
sequence of policies in a symmetric perfect bayesian equilibrium (SPBE) such that any
deviation from this sequence implies that private agents behave as under discretion for all
subsequent periods. In short, there is an endogenous ﬁxed cost of policy deviations.
Characterizing the whole set of sustainable plans is typically diﬃcult, but it is easy to
check whether a given plan is a SPBE or not, and to evaluate it according to ex-ante welfare.
Since in this very simple economy the only link between periods is the bailout policy, I
focus on time-invariant plans. For a plan, I ﬁrst compute the punishment–the expected
discounted sum of future generations’ welfare if the authority deviates from its plan at t.
12Then I compute the reward–the expected discounted sum of future generations’ welfare
if the authority follows the plan at t and future generations expect the same policy. The
ﬁxed cost of a deviation is the diﬀerence between the punishment and the reward, which is
compared to the current beneﬁt of a deviation.
Punishment. I use the largest bailout under discretion to compute the punishment,
Rd =i n f{ d}
where  d is deﬁned in Proposition 3. This is a natural criterion given the nature of the
time-inconsistency problem at hand.






where ex-ante welfare is deﬁned in (3). Note that risky investment continues at full scale.
Reward. Similarly, assuming that a given candidate plan R is an equilibrium, risky







Note that, in contrast to the punishment, the reward depends on the candidate plan R.
Deﬁnition 2 A sustainable equilibrium {it,x t,j t,R t}
∞




t)} form a competitive equilibrium given {Rt,R e
t} according to
(7), (8) and (9).














+ δpunt+1 (Rd) (10)
The left-hand side of (10) is social welfare from stage s =1at t if the plan R = Re
t
is carried out at t. The right-hand side of (10) is social welfare from stage s =1at t if
the authority deviates at t to  R when Re
t = R. Intuitively, a bailout plan is sustainable if
the authority does not deviate from it when agents believe the plan and their behavior is
13sequentially rational (ensured by condition (i)). Since a policy Rt <R e
t distorts households’
consumption without increasing reinvestment scale, plans  R<Rare excluded from (10).







− ˆ V (R)
	
− ω
 R − R
 R − ρ0
i(R) ≤ δ [rewt+1 (R) − punt+1(Rd)] ∀ R ≥ R,∀t (11)
where  d ⊆  s.
Proof. (11) follows form (10).  d ⊆  s since rewt+1 (R) − punt+1(Rd) ≥ 0 for R ∈  d.
Condition (11) may be compared to (6) under discretion. The left-hand side of (11)
represents the current beneﬁt of a policy deviation to a smaller-than-planned bailout. The
right-hand side is the ﬁxed cost of the deviation in terms of future generations’ welfare due
to the realization of an inferior equilibrium from an ex-ante perspective.
Discussion on time-inconsistency. The result that  d ⊆  s is standard in the litera-
ture of sustainable plans, but here it has important implications. As discussed in Section 2.4,
the time-inconsistency problem of bailout policy is diﬀerent than in most applications: It is
not that a promise of a "tough" policy is ex-post broken when agents believe it ex-ante, but
that this promise is broken when agents do not believe it. In particular, inferior equilibrium
outcomes take place when agents expect larger-than-promised bailouts.
Since the optimal policy under commitment, no bailouts, is already time-consistent for an
impatient authority (Proposition 3), such a policy is also time-consistent when the authority
has a long-run policy horizon. Thus, reputation does not help to support time-consistent
bailout policies that are superior from an ex-ante perspective, as in most applications. How-
ever, I show in the following that reputation still alleviates the time-inconsistency problem.
3.3 "Resistant" time-consistent bailout plans
Assume that the authority announces a bailout plan at the beginning of stage 0 every period
but the bailout policy is still decided in stage 1. Entrepreneurs and households, in turn, play
the same trigger strategy as above: They trust the plan if the authority has not deviated
in previous generations, but expect the realization of the largest equilibrium bailout under
discretion if the authority has deviated. In this context, I deﬁne "resistant" time-consistent
bailout plans, identify the best policy in this set, and study its properties.
14Deﬁnition 3 A sustainable bailout plan R is also "resistant" if, ∀Re












That is, a resistant plan satisﬁes two conditions. It is sustainable, so it is time-consistent.
In addition, the plan is not abandoned if agents expect a larger-than-planned bailout, pro-
vided that the expected bailout is also sustainable. This latter requirement implies that if
the authority deviates from the plan, the authority matches expectations.
I now turn to study some basic properties of the best "resistant" time-consistent plan R∗
s.
Proposition 6 The plan R∗
s is such that
(i) R∗
s is the highest bailout policy R that satisﬁes, ∀Re
t ∈ [Rd,R] and ∀t,











t) ≥ δ [punt+1(Rd) − rewt+1 (R)] (13)
(ii) R∗
s is increasing in δ ≤ δ such that R∗
s → Rd as δ → 0 and R∗
s → R∗
c as δ → δ.
(iii) While some plans R>1 are resistant for δ>δ, they are ex-ante inferior than R∗
c.
Proof. (i) Inequality (13) is the closed form of (12). R∗
s is the highest policy R ≤ 1 that
satisﬁes this condition because the optimal ex-ante policy is R∗
c =1 .














which is only consistent with (5) for R = Rd.
For δ>0, the left and the right-hand sides of (13) become negative for any R>R d.A s
ˆ V   > 0 and ˆ V    < 0, the right-hand side decreases more for some R>R d. Hence (13) is
satisﬁed for some R>R d. Since the optimal ex-ante policy is R∗
c =1 , R∗
s >R d.G i v e n
the deﬁnition of the reward and punishment, their diﬀerence for R>R d goes to inﬁnity as
δ → 1. In contrast, the left-hand side of (13) does not depend on δ.T h u s ,R∗
s is increasing
in δ with R∗
s = R∗
c =1for some δ = δ.
(iii) δ>δ implies that some negative bailouts R>1 are sustainable and satisfy (13).
However, such policies are ex-ante suboptimal with respect to R∗
c by deﬁnition.
Proposition 6 obtains a closed form of the condition for a sustainable plan to be resistant
(Deﬁnition 3). This closed form is used extensively in the subsequent analysis. The best
15resistant plan from an ex-ante perspective is the highest R s i n c ee x - a n t ew e l f a r ei si n c r e a s i n g
in R = Re with a maximum at R =1(Proposition 2). Another important point is that the
only "resistant" plan for an impatient authority (δ =0 ) is the lowest time-consistent policy
Rd. Such policy is the only one that is not abandoned to match larger-than-planned bailouts
since any policy R<R d is not an equilibrium. However, as δ increases, higher policies R
become resistant. As δ increases, the ﬁxed cost of a policy deviation increases, so higher R
are resistant to expectations of larger-than-planned bailouts. In addition, the best resistant
bailout plan is increasingly monotone in δ. The concavity of households’ utility implies that
cost in terms of households’ welfare of a deviation from the plan is smaller as the size of the
planned bailout is also smaller (higher R<1). Since the ﬁxed cost of a deviation goes to
inﬁnity, a no-bailouts policy (R =1 ) is a resistant plan for δ ≥ δ<1.
Because in practice it is diﬃcult to increase the patience of the authority, I focus on the




. The next proposition states some key properties of R∗
s.
Proposition 7 There are four properties of the condition in (12) such that an alleviation
of the time-inconsistency leads to substantial welfare gains:
(i) The social cost of bailouts is convex in the bailout size.





. A higher resistant bailout plan increases the ﬁxed cost of a policy deviation,
which further relaxes the condition in (12), so smaller bailouts become resistant.
(iii) The ﬁxed cost for the authority of a deviation from a bailout plan R is convex in R.
(iv) Properties (ii) and (iii) become stronger as δ increases.






because ˆ V   > 0 and ˆ V    < 0,w h e r eW ex−ante (R,R) is deﬁned in (3). This eﬀect is ampliﬁed
by the inﬁnite discounted sum of future generations considered in total welfare.














i.e., there is an exogenous increase φ in the payoﬀ of carrying out some plan R.T h i si m p l i e s
that, for constant xt and it, the smallest resistant bailout plan decreases (R∗
s increases). This
16also implies that the reward term rew(R) increases, which decreases the right-hand side of
(13). This second-round eﬀect further increases R∗
s.
(iii) This is a direct result of (i) and the deﬁnition of the reward and punishment.
(iv) The right-hand side of (13) is convex in δ. Hence, the eﬀect of φ on the right-hand
side of (13) is higher as δ increases. However, R∗
c is also increasing in δ, which when combined
with the property (i) in this proposition may mitigate the overall eﬀect.





implies that the interaction between any change in ﬁnancial regulation or policies and the
time-inconsistency problem of bailouts may be relevant in evaluating the overall eﬀect of
these policy changes. Proposition 7 also stresses that some ﬁnancial policies may be useful
in alleviating the time-inconsistrency problem of bailouts (discussed in Section 5). This is
because the size of bailouts is intrinsically linked to the incentives of entrepreneurs to hoard
liquidity, and thus to welfare. Property (i) in Proposition 7 states that smaller bailouts
produce large welfare gains. Property (ii) shows that smaller time-consistent bailouts imply
a higher cost of a current policy deviation, so even smaller bailouts may be supported.
Property (iii) states that the ﬁxed cost of a deviation from the plan is convex in the diﬀerence
between the smallest resistant plan and the largest bailout under discretion. Property (iv)
shows that this ﬁxed cost is also convex in δ.
Discussion on time-inconsistency. The results in this section imply that, if a time-
consistent plan R>R d is resistant, then deﬁning ex-ante such a plan implies that all
equilibria in which the bailout is larger than planned are ruled out. This limits the extent
in which over-leverage, little liquidity hoarding and distortions in households’ decisions take
place in equilibrium. Note that resistant plans may still be abandoned when agents expect
smaller-than-planned bailouts, but ex-ante welfare is higher than what the plan delivers.
Hence, these deviations are not in the spirit of Kydland and Prescott (1977). Summing
up, reputation helps to alleviate the time-inconsistency problem of bailout policy, but the
mechanism is diﬀerent than in most applications.
This section has another important result: Policies helping to support smaller resistant
bailouts plans may be ampliﬁed by an implicit dynamic spillover (property (ii) in Proposition
7). Most prudential policy proposals focus on correcting banks’ behavior. Instead, this result
suggest that prudential policy should focus on tackling the time-inconsistency of bailout
policy. In what follows, I ﬁrst critically evaluate three popular prudential policy proposals
and later I elaborate on which types of policies can support smaller resistant bailouts plans.
174 A critical view to prudential policy
This section highlights the importance of evaluating ﬁnancial policies taking into account
their interaction with the time-inconsistency problem of bailouts. Two commonly suggested
types of prudential policy–too-big-to-fail size caps and taxes on borrowing–may become
largely ineﬀective in this context. In contrast, some authors have shown concern that another
popular prudential policy, liquidity requerements, becomes ineﬀective if banks use toxic assets
to fool the regulator. I show that this policy still has an indirect positive eﬀect by alleviating
the time-inconsistency problem of bailouts.
4.1 Too-Big-to-Fail size caps
Chari and Kehoe (2009) argue that limiting the size of banks reduces the incentives of the
authority to bailout, and thus alleviates its time-inconsistency problem. However, when
there is an endogenous correlation of risk among banks, I show that a size cap is ineﬀective
in equilibrium if there is a frictionless ﬂow of capital among banks.
Let i∗ be a cap on risky investment scale, it (Re
t =1 )≥ i∗,w i t hit (Re










be the level of "capital" according to (7) such that the desired investment scale i(Re
t) equals
the cap i∗. A∗ (Re
t,i ∗) is increasing in Re
t because as Re
t increases entrepreneurs hoard more
liquidity, so more capital is needed to attain scale i∗.
Given the size cap i∗, entrepreneurs’ idle capital is A − A∗ (Re
t,i ∗). If entrepreneurs are
allowed to use this capital to open another, potentially smaller bank, the total amount of
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18which is independent of the cap i∗ and equals the total desired investment. Large and small
banks may have diﬀerent investment strategies, but the they all have incentive to get exposed
to the same distress state. The total amount of resources under distress that need reﬁnancing
is what matters for the time-consistency of bailouts. Hence, a too-big-to-fail policy fails at
alleviating the time-inconsistency. Of course, if there are frictions in the ﬂow of capital
among banks, size caps will have an eﬀect through reducing the size of risky investment by
a similar mechanism to that operating for liquidity requirements (Section 4.3).
4.2 Taxes on borrowing
This proposal has two motivations. One is the informal argument that banks should pay
ex-ante for the insurance they get ex-post in the form of bailouts. The other, formally
analyzed, proposes a Pigouvian correction of an externality that leads to overborrowing
(Bianchi and Mendoza, 2010; Jeanne and Korinek, 2011). This externality arises because
one borrower hitting their borrowing constraint tightens other borrowers’ constraints in
general equilibrium when credit rationing depends on the value of collateral. The model in
this paper is too simple to capture this externality, but it suﬃces to show that there is a
force inducing overborrowing in the interaction of taxes, the borrowing constraint, and the
time-inconsistency problem of bailouts.
This interaction may take two forms. For the ﬁrst, consider a proportional tax on risky
investment τ to be collected at stage s =0in every period t. Assume that the tax collected
is rebated to entrepreneurs at stage s =2 . Households’ break-even condition is now
it + xtit + τtit − A = α(ρ0 + xt + τ)it
because the total amount borrowed by entrepreneurs includes the tax amount τit and the tax
rebate is pledgeable income. Thus, households receive at stage s =2t h er e b a t ea sp a y m e n t
for their loans to entrepreneurs at s =0if there is no distress at s =1(with probability α).
Hence, risky investment scale is
it (xt,τ)=
A
1+( 1− α)(xt + τ) − αρ0
.
It initially appears that the tax decreases investment scale, but this eﬀect vanishes in
equilibrium. Since the tax rebate is pledgeable, entrepreneurs can use it to get funding for








Focusing on the parameter subspace in which entrepreneurs choose liquidity hoarding to
ensure the continuation of their risky investment at full scale,
xt = R
e
t − ρ0 − τ.
The tax decreases entrepreneurs’ liquidity hoarding xt such that risky investment it re-
mains constant. Therefore, the equilibrium set of discretionary or sustainable monetary
bailouts remain identical. A tax on borrowing becomes ineﬀective because the authority’s
incentives to bailout remain unaﬀected, while entrepreneurs foresee that their credit con-
straint for reinvestment is relaxed. As a result, entrepreneurs cut their liquidity hoarding
(i.e, increase their borrowing) exactly in the amount raised by the tax.
Alternatively, assume that the tax is not rebated to entrepreneurs, so it is not pledgeable,
but transferred to households. The mechanism is now diﬀerent but the result is similar.
Assume that households are also taxed to ﬁnance an exogenous and constant level of public
spending g. Since the only concave component in households’ utility is at stage s =1 ,a s s u m e
that the tax ζ is also levied from the return on riskless investment. Households’ saving at
s =1is now determined by
u
  (e1 − St)=( 1− ζ)Rt.
where ζ satisﬁes ζSt = g and Rt ≤ 1 is the bailout under distress at stage s =1 .
If the amount levied from entrepreneurs τit is used to ﬁnance g,t h et a xo nh o u s e h o l d s
must satisfy ζSt = g − τit.H e n c e ,ζ is decreasing in τ.T h el o w e ri sζ, the lower is also the
cost of the bailout Rt ≤ 1 on distorting households’ consumption decisions. Therefore, a tax
on entrepreneurs’ borrowing reinforces the time-inconsistency problem of bailouts if this tax
decreases households’ tax burden. Since this analysis is similar to the introduction of public
debt, the details are delayed to Section 5.3.
4.3 Liquidity requirements
I ﬁrst sketch an argument on why this policy is considered ineﬀective. Consider a liquidity
requirement proportional to risky investment x ≥ 1 − ρ0 such that it is binding for any
Re
t ∈ [Rd,1]. Assume that there is a cheaper form of liquidity called "toxic assets" with
20price p<1. Denote the investment of a entrepreneur at t in toxic assets as ytit. Toxic assets
pay 1 unit of the good in the no-distress state and pay 0 in the distress state (in contrast
to riskless assets, which pay 1 in either state). Critically, assume that the authority cannot
distinguish between both forms of liquidity, so
xt + yt ≥ x.




yt = x − xt.
Entrepreneurs hold riskless assets up to their desired level of liquidity and use toxic assets
to meet x. Therefore, the reﬁnancing capacity of entrepreneurs in the state of distress is
identical to the case without the liquidity requirement. This is because the time-inconsistency
problem of bailouts provides incentives to entrepreneurs to hold too little liquidity. The
policy x works as a restriction; entrepreneurs try to circumvent it.
This result is due to in Farhi and Tirole (2009). However, a positive indirect eﬀect absent
i nt h e i rw o r ki st h a tx decreases risky investment scale. This allows the authority to support
smaller resistant time-consistent bailouts. To see this, generation-t households’ break even
condition is now




1+( 1− α)xt − αρ0 +( p − α)(x − xt)
.
Hence it (xt,x) is weakly smaller than it (xt) in (7) if p>α . How much smaller depends
on how restrictive x is with respect to the desired level of liquidity hoarding xt.
Let it (Re
t,x) be the investment scale given expected bailouts Re
t and liquidity requirement
x. The condition in (13) for a time-consistent bailout to become resistant is











t,x) ≥ δ [punt+1(Rd,x) − rewt+1 (R,x)]
Since it (Re
t,x) <i t (Re
t) ∀Re
t ∈ [ρ0,1), x introduces an exogenous alleviation of this
condition. Proposition 7 applies and hence R∗
s is increasing in x. The only caveat is that Rd
is also increasing in x, which partially oﬀsets the spillover shown in Proposition 7 because a
21higher Rd reduces the ﬁxed cost of a deviation from a bailout plan. However, bailouts under
discretion do not exhibit a spillover eﬀect, hence R∗
s is increasing more rapidly than Rd in x.
Discussion on time-inconsistency. The goal of these three policy proposals is to
correct banks’ (entrepreneurs’) misbehavior, but they fail to tackle its source in the time-
inconsistency problem of bailouts. A too-big-to-fail size cap fails because ignores endogenous
risk correlation.
The motivation for taxes on borrowing appears after an externality arising in general
equilibrium when there is credit rationing (Bianchi, 2011), which induces over-borrowing. I
show above two warnings regarding with policy. First, both papers studying the correction of
this externality via taxes, Bianchi and Mendoza (2010) and Jeanne and Korinek (2011), use
a reduce form for the functional form of credit rationing. I show that taxes (and speciﬁcally,
rebates) change the payoﬀ proﬁle of borrowers, and thus change the terms of loan contracts.
Hence, a tax on borrowing decreases the incentives to borrow, but the rebate relaxes the
credit constraint without changing the authority’s incentives to bailout. Not rebating the
tax revenue may also induce borrowing if such revenues decrease the distortionary costs of
bailouts. Once again, these results stress the importance of evaluating prudential policy
proposals taking into account their eﬀects on the time-inconsistency problem of bailouts.
My results regarding liquidity requirements also highlight the interplay between ﬁnancial
policies and the time-inconsistency problem of bailouts. In particular, some policies alleviate
the time inconsistency, and thus provide deep incentives to banks (entrepreneurs) to align
their behavior with the social interest. The next section elaborates on this point.
5 Exploiting resistant bailout plans
I now propose three policies that have the potential of making smaller time-consistent bailout
plans resistant. Hence the authority can avoid the realization of worse equilibria. Speciﬁcally,
I discuss the eﬀect of liquidity evaporation, the design of bailouts, and the role of public debt.
5.1 Liquidity evaporation
Liquidity evaporation refers to any spillover mechanism during ﬁnancial crises that leads
short-run securities markets to freeze, haircuts and collateral requirements dramatically in-
crease, etc.; in short, a sharp increase in the liquidity premium or a sudden scarcity of
liquidity. There are a number of potential mechanisms for these phenomena, each labelled
22by a diﬀerent name.10 To examine the implications of liquidity evaporation, instead of fo-
cusing on any speciﬁc mechanism, I simply assume that households ask for an exogenous
premium q>1 over the riskless interest rate if entrepreneurs are forced to downsize the
scale of their risky investment. Alternative assumptions with similar results are an exoge-
nous decrease in pledgeability ρ0, a destruction of liquidity hoarding on xt,o rad e c r e a s ei n
the liquidation value of risky assets (after relaxing zero liquidation value).
Under this assumption, risky investment scale i(Re
t) and liquidity hoarding x(Re
t) remain
identical to equations (7) and (8). This is because downsizing is an oﬀ-equilibrium event.











t) if Rt >R e
t.
I ft h eb a i l o u ti se q u a lo rl a r g e rt h a ne x p e c t e d( Rt ≤ Re
t), risky investment continues at full
scale. However, if the bailout is smaller than expected (Rt >R e
t), entrepreneurs must pay a
premium q>1 over the after-tax return of the riskless asset to borrow from households.


























The key distinction of (14) with respect to (13) is on the left hand side of the inequality.
Given policy R, liquidity evaporation aﬀects welfare in two opposite ways. Entrepreneurs
must pay a premium q>1 over the interest rate R to obtain liquidity, so they are forced
into larger downsizing. But larger downsizing implies larger rebates to households because
rebates are proportional to the tax revenue. Thus, given policy R, the larger is entrepreneurs’
downsizing, the more households invest in the riskless asset, so rebates are larger. The overall
eﬀect on welfare is negative under the assumption in (4). However, another eﬀect is that Rd
also increases when q is smaller, which decreases the resistance of bailouts plans.
Therefore, policies mitigating liquidity evaporation may have strong eﬀects on the incen-
10These mechanisms are not fully independent of each other. Some examples are bank runs (Diamond
and Dibvig, 1983), contagion (Allen and Gale, 2000), rollover risk (Acharya, Gale and Yorulmazer, 2010),
panic (Dasgupta, 2004), liquidity black holes (Morris and Shin, 2004), predatory trading (Brunnermeier
and Pedersen, 2005), liquidity spirals (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009), Knightian uncertainty (Caballero
and Krishnamurthy, 2008; Caballero and Simsek, 2010), bubbly liquidity (Farhi and Tirole, 2010b), and
self-fulﬁlling credit freezes (Bebchuk and Goldstein, 2011).
23tives to hoard liquidity. However, to explore this possibility, it is ﬁrst needed to identify
which of the mechanisms for liquidity evaporation in footnote 10 are most relevant empiri-
cally. For instance, Woodford (1990) pointed out that public debt may serve as a vehicle to
create liquidity in the economy. If such a policy is eﬀective in reducing liquidity evaporation,
Proposition 7 implies that this policy will also produce large eﬀects on reducing entrepre-
neurs’ incentives to overborrow by alleviating the time-inconsistency problem of bailouts.
5.2 The design of bailouts
A key assumption to obtain the perfect correlation of risk exposure in equilibrium is that
bailouts are untargetted policy–i.e., it does not discriminate among banks. However, the
exact design of a bailout plan may generate diﬀerent incentives in diﬀerent types of banks
that may break the correlation.
For instance, Acharya and Yorulmazer (2006) show that there is a trade-oﬀ in banks’
decision to correlate risk: The higher the correlation, the larger the bailout is in equilibrium–
as sketched in Section 2.5, but a bank that does not correlate its risk with other banks may
take advantage of the ineﬃcient liquidation of assets under distress (after relaxing zero
liquidation value, as assumed throughout this paper.)
If this assumption is relaxed, a bailout design that facilitates the access to liquidity not of
the failing banks, but of the buyer banks decreases the beneﬁt of risk correlation, which may
provide enough incentives for banks to uncorrelate their exposition. Acharya and Yorulmazer
(2006) show that this incentive is stronger for bigger banks. My results complement their
conclusion by pointing out that the design of bailouts may not only break the correlation of
risk exposure, but also reduce the incentives for overborrowing.
5.3 The role of public debt
Section 4.3 implicitly conveys the idea that raising households’ tax burden increases the dis-
tortionary cost of bailouts. Thus, higher distortionary taxes alleviate the time-inconsistency
problem. Public debt has the property that aﬀects tax burden but it is predetermined with
respect to the bailouts implementation. Thus, public debt works as a state variable in the
authority’s time-inconsistency problem. Hence, taxation to repay public debt is unrelated
to the authority’s problem to set and implement bailout plans. The use of public debt as a
commitment device is not novel to this paper; it has been used in the contexts of monetary
and ﬁscal policy such as in Persson, Persson and Svensson (2006) and Dominguez (2007).
24Similarly to Section 4.3, assume that a tax rate ζ on the return to riskless investment at
stage s =1in every period t is used to pay g, now interpreted as the service of public debt.
The tax rate is such that ζSt = g,w h e r eSt is determined by u  (e1 − St)=( 1− ζ)R,w i t h
R =1in the no-distress state and R ≤ 1 in the distress state.
Then, the time-consistency condition for a bailout plan R ∈  s is, ∀Re
t ∈ [Rd,R],
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e0 + αˆ V (1,ζ)+( 1− α)

ˆ V (Rd,ζ) − (1 − Rd)i(Rd)
	







e0 + αˆ V (1,ζ)+( 1− α)

ˆ V (R,ζ) − (1 − R)i(R)
	
+ β (ρ1 − ρ0)i(R)
	
,
ˆ V (R,ζ)=u(e1 − St)+St such that u
  (e1 − St)=( 1− ζ)R.
The tax ζ is levied regardless of whether there is distress or not. Given the properties
of ˆ V (R) in (2), ˆ V (·) is concave and increasing in (1 − ζ)R<1 and has zero slope for
(1 − ζ)R =1 .Ah i g h e rζ increases the cost of the distortion introduced by a bailout R<1.
Thus, a higher ζ increases the left-hand side of (15), so Proposition 7 applies. However, ζ
aﬀects both the reward and the punishment, as well as Rd. Therefore, the spillover eﬀects
stated in the property (ii) of Proposition 7 may not fully apply.
Discussion on time-inconsistency. The three types of policy analyzed highlight that
not only prudential policy, i.e., policies implemented before crises, may serve to correct
banks (entrepreneurs) misbehavior. In fact, policies enacted before, during or even after
crises achieve this goal as long as they alleviate the time-inconsistency problem of bailouts.
This alleviation takes place either because the largest time-consistent bailout under discretion
decreases (Rd is higher) or because the smallest resistant bailout plan decreases (R∗
s is higher).
6 Concluding remarks
This paper calls attention to ﬁnancial policies focusing on exploiting the authority’s concern
on future moral hazard to rule out large bailouts in equilibrium. Such policies have the
potential to generate large welfare gains even if they are not successful enough to eliminate
the time-inconsistency. This focus has the advantage of creating incentives to discipline
the behavior of ﬁnancial market participants, so banks will not try to circumvent them–
25as they will with many standard prudential policies. In any case, this paper also shows
that many policies may have important indirect eﬀects through their interaction with the
time-inconsistency problem of bailouts; some may become more eﬀective, others less. All
these results have capital importance in current ﬁnancial policy discussions responding to
the recent ﬁnancial crises which have not been formally stressed before. It is unlikely that
these results qualitatively depend on the speciﬁc environment studied in this paper.
A limitation of my analysis, though, is its silence regarding the optimal mix of ﬁnancial
policies. This is because such task requires an empirically validated macroeconomic model
of ﬁnancial crises. This model lacks in the literature despite it is badly needed; I believe,
however, that this paper may serve as an input to build such a model.
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8 Appendix: Notation Table
s : stages, s =0 ,1,2
t : periods (generations) , t =0 ,1,2,...
V : one-generation households’ total utility
u : one-generation households’ utility in s =1
U : one-generation entrepreneurs’ total utility
β : weight of U on the authority’s objective
Rt : after-tax riskless returns in s =1
Re
t : expected after-tax riskless returns in s =0
ρ0 : risky return pledgeable
ρ1 : total risky return
α : probability of no distress in s =1
e0,e 1 : households’ endowment in s =0 ,1
A : entrepreneurs’ endowment in s =0
it : generation-t’s risky investment in s =0
xt : entrepreneurs’ liquidity in s =0as proportion of i
Snd : households’ savings in s =1if no distress
Sd : households’ savings in s =1if distress
V ex−ante(Rt,R e
t): generation-t households’ total utility if Rt and Re
t
ˆ V (R)=u(e1 − S)+S with u  (·)=Rt : term indicating the distortion in savings by Rt
Uex−ante(Rt,R e
t): generation-t entrepreneurs’ total utility if Rt and Re
t
W ex−ante(Rt,R e
t): generation-t total utility if Rt and Re
t
R∗
c =1: equilibrium policy under commitment
W ex−post(Rt,R e
t): generation-t utility for s =1 ,2 if Rt and Re
t
28 d : set of equilibrium policies under discretion
Rd : inferior equilibrium policy under discretion
w = β (ρ1 − ρ0) − (1 − ρ0) > 0: parameters subspace in which there is time-inconsistency
α1 + α2 = α : prob. of no distress when there are two distress states
λ : portion of entrepreneurs exposed to distress1
punt (Rd): discounted sum of generations’ welfare for Rd
rewt (R): discounted sum of generations’ welfare for R
 s : set of sustainable plans
R∗
s highest sustainable plan that is resistant
¯ ı : size cap
¯ A : entrepreneurs endowment such that it =¯ ı
τ : tax on borrowing
ζ : additional tax (subsidy) on riskless return
¯ x : liquidity requirement
yt : position on toxic assets as proportion of it
p : price of toxic assets
q : liquidity premium
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